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552 PEOPLE v. CHAMBERS [37 C.2d 
property to her on the date of the breach. The fact that there 
was a falling market on and following that date must be con-
sidered in connection with the price finally obtained in order 
to estimate the value as of the date of breach, but that fact 
also must be considered as affecting the price reasonably 
obtainable by a seller who first learns on the date of breach 
that a new purchaser must be obtained. 
In other words, an appraiser in estimating, and a court in 
finding, the value to the seller on the date of breach must 
necessarily take into consideration the fact that some appre-
ciable time is ordinarily required to find a purchaser ready, 
able and willing to buy. The value to the seller on the date 
of breach should be the price obtainable on an offering of the 
property on that date with allowance for a reasonable time 
within which to find a purchaser. Certainly the seller who 
does not breach his contract should not have to anticipate 
a breach by the contracting purchaser nor should such a seller 
have to stand all or any part of the loss necessarily flowing 
from the purchaser's breach. Thus, if the price finally ob-
tained in a falling market is the best price which reasonably 
could be procured, with due diligence, on an offering made as 
of the date of breach, the value to the seller as of such date 
would be no more than the price actually obtained. 
[L. A. No. 21478. In Bank. July 13, 1951.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LOVELL C. 
CHAMBERS, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Taxation- Exemptions- Property of State.- State-owned 
property is not subject to taxation, and taxation thereof and 
tax deeds resulting therefrom are void. 
[2] State of California-Limitation of Actions.-Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 315, must be construed as declaring, in effect, that the state 
will not sue "for or in respect to real property'' except where 
the cause of action has accrued within 10 years before any 
action or other proceeding for the same is commenced. 
[2] See 16 Cal.Jur. 414, 435; 34 Am.Jur. 65. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, § 71; [2, 3, 6, 8] State of 
California, § 73 (2) ; [ 4, 5] Adverse Possession, § 11; [7, 9] Taxa-
tion, § 377.1; [10, 11] Taxation, § 319; [12, 13] Public Lands, § 228; 
[14-16] Taxation, § 376(1); [17] Taxation, § 324. 
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[3] !d.-Limitation of Actions.-As contemplated by Code Civ. 
Proc., § 315, the state's cause of action to remove defendant's 
tax deed as a cloud on the state's title to real property arises 
not on the date the state first acquires title, but on the date 
defendant receives his tax deed. 
[4] Adverse Possession-Property Held for Public Use.-Neither 
Code Civ. Proc., § 315 nor § 318 et seq., which relate to adverse 
possession, apply to property owned by the state and devoted 
to a public use. ( Civ. Code, §§ 1006, 1007.) 
[5] !d.-Property Held for Public Use.-Real property deeded to 
the state, accepted for the state by the State Park Commis-
sion and included in a state park system, is owned by the 
state and devoted to a public use so as to render it not subject 
to Code Civ. Proc., § 315, or to § 318 et seq., which relate to 
adverse possession. (See Pub. Resources Code, § 5003.) 
[6] State of California-Limitation of Actions.-Tacking may not 
be used to establish the passage of a period in a statute of 
limitation on the state's action to quiet title to its property 
devoted to a public use. 
[7a, 7b] Taxation-Actions Affecting Tax Titles-Limitations.-
The limitation provisions, Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 175, 3521, 3725, 
relating to actions testing the validity of tax deeds, do not 
apply to the state's action to remove a tax deed as a cloud on 
its property devoted to a public use. 
[8] State of California-Limitation of Actions.-The rule that gen-
eral statutes of limitation apply against the state and its 
agencies when its sovereign rights are not involved does not 
require application against the state, in its action to quiet title 
to its real property, of a statute of limitation which is not 
expressly made applicable to the state, since the rule springs 
from Code Civ. Proc., § 345, which deals with limitations on 
actions other than for recovery of real property. 
[9] Taxation- Actions Affecting Tax Titles- Limitations.- The 
1939 enactments of Pol. Code, § 3831.1, and Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 121, which include the state within their definition of a tax-
ing agency, did not nullify decisions rendered prior thereto 
holding certain limitation provisions in the tax statutes to be 
inapplicable to the state, where such limitation provisions make 
no mention of taxing agencies, and the defining provisions are 
therefore inapplicable. 
[10] Id.-Tax Sales-Consent of Taxing Agency-Effect on Tax 
Lien or Rights.-Assuming that "taxing agency" as used in 
Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3695, includes the state, the provision 
[ 4] Use of property by public as affecting acquisition of title 
by adverse possession, note, 2 A.L.R. 1368. See, also, 1 Cal.Jur. 
502; 1 Am.Jur. 848. 
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refers only to tax or assessment liens of governmental units 
other than the county, where it states that if such agency 
consents to a tax sale, the lien of its taxes or assessments and 
any rights it may have to the property as a result of such 
taxes and assessments are cancelled by the sale. 
[11] !d.-Tax Sales-Disposition After Deed to State-Authority 
of Controller.-Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3694, requiring the Con-
troller to approve the sale of property tax-deeded to the state, 
does not authorize him to covenant for the state to the con-
veyance of its property, title to which was obtained from a 
source other than a tax deed, and which is devoted to a 
public use. 
[12] Public Lands-Disposal of State Lands.-State lands devoted 
to a public use may be disposed of only in the manner specified 
by statute. 
[13] !d.-Disposal of State Lands.-An attempt by an unauthor-
ized state officer to dispose of state land devoted to a public 
use is void. 
[14] Taxation-Actions Affecting Tax Titles-Reimbursement of 
Purchaser.-A private owner of property may not have his 
title quieted against a tax deed unless he pays the purchaser 
at the tax sale and deed holder the taxes paid by the deed 
holder. 
[15] !d.-Actions Affecting Tax Titles-Reimbursement of Pur-
chaser.-In the absence of statute, a purchaser from the state 
or public agency at a tax sale cannot recover from the seller the 
purchase price or the taxes subsequently assessed even though 
the taxes were illegally assessed or levied, or the property was 
not subjct to taxation or the tax deed was void. 
[16] !d.-Actions Affecting Tax Titles-Reimbursement of Pur-
chaser.-Where a statute provides for recovery by the pur-
chaser at a void tax sale of the purchase price or'taxes he paid, 
that remedy is exclusive. 
[17] !d.-Tax Sales-Right of Purchaser to Refund.-Rev. & Tax. 
Code, §§ 3728, 3728.1, providing for refunds to purchasers under 
a void tax sale, are based on the assumption that there are some 
taxes payable, and are inapplicable to a purchase of untaxable 
state-owned property. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. C. M. Monroe, Judge. Affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. 
[15] Right of holder of tax title to reimbursement by taxing au-
thorities where sale proves invalid; notes, 77 A.L.R. 824; 116 A.L.R. 
1408. See, also, 24 Cal.Jur. 391, 394; 51 Am.Jur. 982. 
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.Action to quiet title. Part of judgment quieting plaintiff's 
title affirmed; part of judgment imposing condition that 
plaintiff reimburse defendant for cost of tax deed and taxes 
paid, reversed. 
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, .Attorneys Gen-
eral, and Walter S. Rountree and Dan Kaufmann, Deputy .At-
torneys General, for Plaintiff and .Appellant. 
Solon S. Kipp and W. E. Starke for Defendant and 
.Appellant. 
CARTER, J.-Both parties appeal from a decree quieting 
title in plaintiff to a section of land in San Diego County 
conditioned upon the reimbursement of defendant by plain-
tiff of the amount paid by defendant to obtain a tax deed 
from plaintiff 
In 1933, Mr. and Mrs. Busch were the owners of the prop-
erty. In that year they conveyed the property to plaintiff-
state. The latter through the State Park Commission 
accepted the conveyance and made the property a part of 
the state park system . 
.At the time of the conveyance to the state there were 
unpaid taxes levied by San Diego County on the property. 
In 1934 the county instigated delinquent tax proceedings 
by reason of those taxes and the property was ''sold'' to 
plaintiff thereunder. In 1939 the property was conveyed 
by tax deed to plaintiff for the delinquent 1933 taxes. On 
March 11, 1940, the property was conveyed by tax deed 
from plaintiff to defendant. Taxes have been levied on the 
property for the years since then and paid by defendant. It 
was to eliminate that tax deed, as a cloud on its title, which 
prompted plaintiff to commence the instant action on May 
28,1947. 
Plaintiff's theory (and that of the trial court) is that the 
tax lien on the property, when it received the conveyance 
from the Busches, merged in its title thus acquired, and all 
the delinquent tax proceedings, including the final deed, 
were void for it owned the property which made it exempt 
from taxation. (Cal. Const., art XIII, § 1.) [1] It is not 
questioned that property belonging to the state is not sub-
ject to taxation, and taxation thereof, and tax deeds resultjng 
therefrom are void. (See People v. Doe G. 1034, 36 Cal. 
220; Warren v. Oity w County of San Francisco, 150 Cal. 
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167 [88 P. 712] ; Los Angeles v. Board of Sttpervisors, 108 
Cal.App. 655 [292 P. 539]; State Land Settlement Board v. 
Henderson, 197 Cal. 470 [241 P. 560j; Sutter-Yuba Inv. 
Co. v. Waste, 52 Cal.App.2d 785 [127 P.2d 25]; Anderson-
Cottonwood I. Dist. v. Klukkert, 13 Cal.2d 191 [88 P.2d 
685] ; Smith v. City of Santa Monica, 162 Cal. 221 [121 P. 
920] ; W e'bste1· v. Board of Regents of U. C., 163 Cal. 705 
[126 P. 974] .) 
The main controversy concerns the effect of statutes of 
limitation on plaintiff's action. In his amended answer de-
fendant asserts that the action is barred by sections 315 and 
345 of the Code of Civil Procedure and sections 175, 3521, 
3725 and 3726 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. 
[2, 3] The first provision invoked reads: "The people of 
this state will not sue any person for or in respect to any 
real property, or the issues or profits thereof, by reason of 
the right or title of the people to the same, unless-1. Such 
right or title shall have accrued within ten years before any 
action or other proceeding for the same is commenced; 
or, 2. The people, or those from whom they claim, shall have 
received the rents and profits of such real property, or some 
part thereof, within the space of ten years.'' (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 315.) That section cannot bar the action for two 
reasons : First, it will be remembered that defendant ob-
tained his tax deed in 1940 and the action was commenced 
in 1947, less than the 10-year limitation. Defendant argues 
that the period commenced to run in 1933 when plaintiff 
acquired title from the Busches, because the statute says 
(subd. 1) that the time runs from the time of acquisition 
by the plaintiff-state. 'l'hat contention was settled contrary 
to defendant's assertion in 1885 by People v. Center, 66 Cal. 
551, 564 [5 P. 263, 6 P. 481], where the court said the section 
must be construed ''as declaring, in effect, that the people 
of the state will not sue 'for or in respect to real property,' 
except where the cause of action has accrued within ten 
years." (Italics added.) The Center case has been con-
sistently followed. (See People v. Banning Co., 167 Cal. 643 
[140 P. 587]; People v. Kings County Dev. Co., 177 Cal. 529, 
534 [171 P. 102]; Wilhoit v. Tubbs, 83 Cal. 279 [23 P. 386]; 
Doyle v. San Diego Land & Town Co., 43 F. 349.) The cause 
of action would not accrue until defendant received his tax 
deed on March 11, 1940. 
[4, 5] Second, neither section 315 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure nor the provisions on adverse possession (limitations 
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on actions for the recovery of real property, Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 318 et seq.) apply to property owned by the state and 
devoted to a public use. (See Civ. Code, §§ 1006, 1007; 
People v. Kerber, 152 Cal. 731 [93 P. 878, 125 .Am.St.Rep. 
93]; Henry Cowell Lime & Cement Co. v. State, 18 Cal. 2d 
169 [114 P.2d 331] ; Richer·t v. City of San Diego, 109 Cal..App. 
548 [293 P. 673]; People v. Banning Co., supra, 167 Cal. 
643; Ames v. San Diego, 101 Cal. 390 [35 P. 1005] ; Board 
of Education v. Martin, 92 Cal. 209 [28 P. 799] ; San Fran-
cisco v. Straut, 84 Cal. 124 [24 P. 814]; Orack v. Powelson, 
3 Cal..App. 282 [85 P. 129] ; San Francisco v. Calderwood, 
31 Cal. 585 [91 .Am.Dec. 542] ; Fresno Irr. Dist. v. Smith, 
58 Cal..App.2d 48 [136 P.2d 382] ; Cmtnty of Sacramento v. 
Lauszus, 70 Cal..App.2d 639 [161 P.2d 460] ; Hoadley v. 
San, Franm:sco, 50 Cal. 265; People v. Pope, 53 Cal. 437; 
County of Yolo v. Barney, 79 Cal. 375 [21 P. 833, 12 
.Am.St.Rep. 152] ; San Francisco v. Bradbury, 92 Cal. 414 
[28 P. 803] ; Patton v. City of Los Angeles, 169 Cal. 521 
[147 P. 141]; City of Los Angeles v. Forrester, 12 Cal..App.2d 
146 [55 P.2d 277]; City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co., 
209 Cal. 105 [287 P. 475]; Reclamation Dist. No. 833 v. 
American Farms Co., 209 Cal. 74 [285 P. 688]; 1 Cal.Jur. 
497-508.) Here, in 1933, the property was deeded to the 
state by the Busches, accepted for the state by the State 
Park Commission for park purposes and was included in 
the state park system, and, the law provides that : ''The 
State Park Commission shall administer, protect, and develop 
the State park system for the use and enjoyment of the 
public .... " (Pub. Resources Code, § 5003.) 
[6] Defendant urges, however, that the plaintiff knew 
in 1933 that the property was sold for taxes by San Diego 
County to it for it is presumed to have been notified of it 
(Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3440; Code Civ. Proc., § 1963 (15)) 
and that its title was then in jeopardy and the limitation 
period started to run. It is difficult to see how it would 
know its title was in jeopardy when the sale was to it, but 
in any event that is merely another way of arguing that 
title was lost under section 315 or the provisions on adverse 
possession, for the relief would be against the county, not 
defendant, and it would require "tacking" on limitation 
periods (adding together the time while it ran in favor of 
the county and defendant) which plainly is not applicable 
except in adverse possession which is unavailable to de-
fendant. 
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[7a] Other limitation provisions asserted by defendant are 
as follows: (1) A deed issued to the state by reason of delin-
quent taxes is conclusively presumed valid unless held invalid 
in a proceeding to determine its validity commenced within 
a year after the execution of the deed or after the effective 
date of the statute (Stats. 1945, ch. 1017, § 1) whichever is 
later. (Rev. & Tax. Code,§ 175); (2) "A proceeding based on 
an alleged invalidity or irregularity of any deed to the State 
for taxes or of any proceedings leading up to the deed can 
only be commenced within one year after the date of record-
ing of the deed to the State in the county recorder's office 
or within one year after June 1, 1941, whichever is later." 
(Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3521); and (3) "A proceeding based 
on alleged invalidity or irregularity of any proceedings in-
stituted under this chapter can only be commenced within 
one year after the date of execution of the tax collector's 
deed." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3725.) The chapter deals with 
sales to private parties after deed to the state. (Rev. & Tax. 
Code, § 3691 et seq.) 
Plaintiff argues that those provisions are not controlling 
because they do not apply to the state and there was no 
authority whatsoever for any of the tax proceedings-they 
were a complete nullity. 
[8] It has been held that general statutes of limitation 
apply against various agencies of the state or the state when 
its ''sovereign'' rights are not involved. (City of Los An-
geles v. County of Los Angeles, 9 Cal.2d 624 [72 P.2d 138, 
113 A.L.R. 370], against a city when suing a county; San 
Francisco v. Luning, 73 Cal. 610 [15 P. 311], against munici-
pal corporations; People v. Melone, 73 Cal. 574 [15 P. 294], 
against state; State Bd. of Health v. Alameda County, 42 
Cal.App. 166 [183 P. 455], and Tehama County v. Pacific 
Gas & Elec. Co., 33 Cal.App.2d 465 [91 P.2d 936], against 
county; City of Fullerton v. County of Orange, 140 Cal.App. 
464 [35 P.2d 397], against city in action by it against county; 
People v. Osgood, 104 Cal.App. 133 [285 P. 753], against 
state; People v. Kings County Dev. Co., 48 Cal.App. 72 [191 
P. 1004] .) That rules springs from the code provision 
reading: ''The limitations prescribed in this chapter apply 
to actions brought in the name of the State or county or 
for the benefit of the State or county, in the same manner 
as to actions by private parties, ... " (Italics added.) 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 345.) 
The chapter referred to is chapter 3 of part 2, title 2 
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of the code which deals with limitation for actions other than 
for the recovery of real property. The latter type of ac-
tions including section 315, are in chapter 2. It has been 
recognized that as to limitations in that chapter (3) that 
the state has included itself. (San Francisco v. Luning, 
supra, 73 Cal. 610; People v. Melone, supra, 73 Cal. 57 4; 
State Bd. of Health v. Alarneda County, supra, 42 Cal.App. 
166; Philbrick v. State Personnel Board, 53 Cal.App.2d 
222 [127 P.2d 634].) People v. Osgood, supra, 104 Cal.App. 
133, and People v. Kings Cot~nty Dev. Co., supra, 48 Cal.App. 
72, state that the general policy of the state is to be bound 
by statutes of limitation, but that is hardly in conformity 
with the restricted wording of section 345, supra. 
It has been, on the other hand, generally stated that 
statutes of limitation do not apply against the state unless 
expressly made applicable. (See Oakland v. Oakland. Water 
Front Co., 118 Cal. 160 [50 P. 277]; Russ &; Sons Co. v. 
Crichton, 117 Cal. 695 [49 P. 1043]; People v. City of Los 
Angeles, 93 Cal.App. 532 [269 P. 934] ; Philbrick v. State 
Personnel Board, supra, 53 Cal.App.2d 222; People v. Cali-
fornia Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 593 [138 P. 79] .) 
In Russ &; Sons Co. v. Crichton, supra, 117 Cal. 695, 699 
the issue was whether a provision of the Political Code deal-
ing with taxation, which provided that if a tax deed is not 
made to the purchaser within a year and three months after 
the act takes effect, the purchaser has no right thereunder, 
applied to the issuance of a tax deed to the state. It was 
held that it did not, and the court said: "In Tuttle v. 
Block, 104 Cal. 443 [38 P. 109], it was held that the said 
provision was 'clearly a prospective statute of limitation of 
the time within which the tax deed must have been made'; 
and the rule is settled beyond all controversy that statutes 
of limitation do not apply to or bind the state, unless they 
are made to do so by express words or necessary implication. 
"The language of the provision, 'in all cases,' etc., is 
apparently broad enough to include the state; but a statute 
will not always be held to include every case to which it may 
appear on its face to be applicable." With respect to tax 
statutes, the above statement is in line with the general rule 
that tax statutes do not apply against the state as to its prop-
erty. (People v. Doe G. 1034, S1tpra, 36 Cal. 220; Webster v. 
Board of Regents of U. C., supra, 163 Cal. 705; Low v. 
Lewis, 46 Cal. 549; Smith v. City of Santa Monica, supra, 
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162 Cal. 221; Bolton v. Terra Bella Irr. Dist., 106 Cal.App. 
313 [289P.678].) 
[7b] In any event it seems that if the statutes on adverse 
possession do not run against property of the state which is 
dedicated to a public purpose (see authorities cited supra) 
the opposite result should not be reached, depriving the 
state of its property, by application to it of the provisions, 
supra, of the Revenue and Taxation Code. We hold there-
fore that they do not apply to the state. 
[9] Defendant claims that the authorities heretofore cited 
with reference to the inapplicability of the limitation provi-
sions in tax statutes were wiped out by the provision enacted 
in 1939 (Stats. 1939, ch. 529, Pol. Code, § 3831.1, Rev. & 
'fax. Code, § 121) which included the "state" in the defi-
nition of a "Taxing Agency." We do not think any such 
result was intended. There is nothing said about any taxing 
agencies in the sections of the Revenue and Taxation Code, 
supra, invoked by defendant, and hence the "definition" 
section would not seem to be applicable. 
[10] In this same connection defendant urges, specifically, 
that under section 3695 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, 
the state consented to the tax sale. The code authorizes the 
sale of property by the tax collector after deed to the state 
upon approval of the county board of supervisors and the 
State Controller. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 3691, 3694.) "If 
the governing body of any taxing agency does not, before 
the date of sale, file with the tax collector and the board of 
supervisors certified copies of a resolution adopted by the 
governing body objecting to the sale, the taxing agency has 
consented to the sale. If the taxing agency consents to the 
sale the lien of its taxes or assessments and any rights which 
it may have to the property as a result of such taxes or 
assessments are canceled by a sale under this chapter and it 
ifl entitled to its proper share of the proceeds deposited in 
the delinquent tax sale trust fund .... " (Rev. & Tax. 
Code, § 3695.) (Italics added.) Assuming that the phrase 
"taxing agency" as there used includes the state, it plainly 
refers only to tax or assessment liens of governmental units 
other than the county and makes provision for safeguarding 
such interests when the county sells the property, and it is 
only those liens which are cancelled if no objection to the 
sale is made. That is evident from the italicized portion of 
the section. Plaintiff-state here is not claiming title or inter-
est by reason of any tax lien. Its title is founded upon the 
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conveyance from the Busches in 1933. Nor can it be sup-
posed that the State Controller, by his consent to the sale, 
could authorize the divestiture of the state's title to prop-
erty devoted to a public use. (See Smith v. City of Santa 
Monica, 162 Cal. 221 [121 P. 920].) [11] Section 3694 
of the code requiring the Controller to approve the sale 
of property tax deeded to the state, cannot be construed to 
authorize him to covenant for the state to the conveyance 
of its property, title to which was obtained from a source 
other than a tax deed, and which is devoted to a public use. 
[12, 13] Lands of the state, at least those devoted to a public 
use, may be disposed of only in the manner specified by 
statute. (Buck v. Canty, 162 Cal. 226 [121 P. 924] ; Mes-
senger v. Kingsbury, 158 Cal. 611 [112 P. 65]) and an 
attempt by a state officer, not authorized to dispose of state 
land devoted to a public use, is void. (People v. California 
Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576 [138 P. 79].) 
As above noted the trial court made its decree conditional 
on plaintiff's paying to defendant the amount he paid for the 
property at the tax sale to him and for taxes subsequently 
levied on the property by San Diego County. Plaintiff ap-
peals from that portion of the judgment and defendant makes 
no contention that it is correct. He relies solely upon his 
asserted ownership of the property. [14] Nevertheless it 
may be observed that it is the settled rule that a private 
owner of property may not have his title quieted against 
a tax deed unless he pays the purchaser at the tax sale and 
deed holder the taxes paid by the latter. [15] But in the 
absence of statute, a purchaser from the state or public 
agency at a tax sale cannot recover from the seller the pur-
chase price paid or the taxes subsequently assessed even 
though the taxes were illegally assessed or levied, the prop-
erty was not subject to taxation or the tax deed was void. 
(Routh v. Quinn, 20 Cal.2d 488 [127 P.2d 1, 149 A.L.R. 215] ; 
Loomis v. County of Los Angeles, 59 Cal. 456; Brooks v. 
County of Tulare, 117 Cal. 465 [49 P. 469]; Bell v. County of 
Los Angeles, 90 Cal.App. 602 [266 P. 291]; Coleman v. 
County of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 714 [182 P. 440]; Holland 
v. Hotchkiss, 162 Cal. 366 [123 P. 258, L.R.A. 1915C 492); 
24 Cal.Jur. 391-2; 77 A.L.R. 824; 116 A.L.R. 1408.) 
[16] \Vhere a statute provides for recovery, that remedy is 
exclusive. (See Bell Y. County of Los Angeles, supra, 90 
Cal.App. 602; Southern Service Co., Ltd., v. Los Angeles, 
15 Cal.2d 1, 11 [97 P.2d 963].) There are statutory provi-
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sions with reference to reimbursement in this state. 
The basic rule applicable is: ''The purchaser of tax sold 
or tax deeded property is entitled to a refund of the amount 
paid as purchase price whenever it is determined by the 
board of supervisors that the property belongs to the United 
States, this State, a city, or other political subdivision of 
this State and should not have been sold for taxes. The 
refund shall be made in the same manner as a refund of an 
overpayment of tax." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3730.) Thus 
it is seen that the county must make a refund of the purchase 
price. 
[17] There are other provisions for refunds but they 
plainly deal with situations where the taxes are validly levied 
and payable but the deed is void. Then the refund to the 
purchaser should be made by the owner or taxpayer. Before 
holding void a tax deed given under certain provisions of 
the code the court shall determine the correct amount of 
taxes, penalties and costs that should be paid upon redemp-
tion to discharge the tax liens of all taxing agencies "had 
the purported tax sale not been held'' and shall order the 
former owner to pay from such amount in six months to the 
purchaser the amount expended by him in pursuit of the 
"State's title to the property" and for improvements and to 
the county the balance. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3728.) If the 
amount is not paid within the time fixed a new deed shall 
be "issued." (I d. § 3728.1.) Those provisions are based 
on the assumption that there are some taxes payable. Here 
there can be none, for the property was not taxable, and 
they apply where the owner, when the property was taxed, 
was a private person rather than the state. 
The portion of the judgment quieting plaintiff's title is 
affirmed. The portion imposing the reimbursement condition 
is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
